Abstract. This paper presents an operational reconstruction technique of most stream ciphers. We primarily expose it for key-stream generators which consist of several linear feedback shift registers combined by a nonlinear Boolean function. It is shown how to completely recover the different feedback polynomials and the combining function, when the algorithm is totally unknown. This attack only requires the knowledge of some ciphertexts, which may be generated from different secret keys. Estimates of necessary ciphertext length and experimental results are detailed.
Introduction
Stream ciphers are an important class of cipher systems. They are widely used by the world's militaries and governmental offices. They also are very often used in industrial encryption products. The success of stream ciphers comes from the fact that they are very easy to build: they need only few logic gates in VLSI circuitry. They are therefore particularly appropriate to embedded systems (satellites for example) or to the systems for which maintenance is either impossible or very difficult. Moreover, their use is particularly well-suited when errors may occur during the transmission because they avoid error propagation.
In a binary additive stream cipher, the ciphertext is obtained by adding bitwise the plaintext to a pseudo-random sequence called the running-key (or the key-stream). The running-key is produced by a pseudo-random generator whose initialization is the secret key shared by the users. Most practical designs of pseudo-random generators center around linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) combined by a nonlinear Boolean function. Different variants can actually be found: clock-controlled systems, filter generators, multiplexed systems... [13] . We here focus on the most common class of combination generators depicted in Figure 1 . The other very important aspect is that the designs are often secret and contrary to block ciphers, generally no public evaluation is possible. Although such stream ciphers may be vulnerable to some attacks [11, 7, 6] , cryptanalysis becomes much harder when the algorithm is unknown. During World War II, US cryptanalysts had to face this problem with the Japanese PURPLE machine [8] : they reconstructed it before cryptanalysing it. This paper presents a similar approach and a reconstruction technique of stream ciphers allowing, from ciphertexts only, complete recovering of the unknown algorithm. By algebraic and statistical results, all the cryptographic primitives constituting the system (the LFSR characteristics and the combining function) can be recovered. After this reconstruction step, the LFSR initializations can be found by classical correlation attacks [11, 7, 6, 1] .
The reconstruction has been conducted on the following basis and assumptions:
-The system is a combination generator. Most practical designs use combining functions with up to 5 or 7 variables (i.e., registers). In this paper we will only consider additive stream ciphers but generalization to other combining functions can be envisaged with suitable modifications. -We use only ciphertexts, possibly generated from different secret keys. Each of them, however, must be of a realistic length. -We know the plaintext encoding (or at least some of its statistical parameters) and the linguistic group of the plaintext language. -We accept very long computing time since work is done only once (and for all) and as long as it remains far lower than the life of the algorithm itself.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical tools we use in the reconstruction. In Section 3, we show how to recover the LFSRs and we give some simulation results. We precisely analyze the complexity of this attack and we estimate the number of required ciphertext bits. Section 4 focuses on the combining function recovering.
Theoretical Background

Linear Feedback Shift Register Sequences
A linear feedback shift register of length L is characterized by a univariate polynomial P over F 2 of degree L, called the feedback polynomial,
It associates to any L-bit initialization (s t ) 1≤t≤L a sequence (s t ) t>0 defined by the L-th order linear recurrence relation.
Most applications use a primitive feedback polynomial since this ensures that the periods of all sequences produced by the LFSR are maximal.
We now recall some well-known properties on LFSR sequences. In the following, S(P ) denotes the set of all sequences produced by the LFSR with feedback polynomial P . Proposition 1. [15, 5, 14] Let P and Q be two non constant polynomials over F 2 . Then we have
where R is the least common multiple of P and Q.
Equality This proposition implies that if a sequence s is generated by a LFSR with feedback polynomial P , then it satisfies the recurrence relations (or parity-check equations) corresponding to P Q for any Q ∈ F 2 [X]. For a given feedback polynomial P of degree L, we focus on all recurrence relations corresponding to the multiples of P of weight d, where d is small. A similar approach is used in fast correlation attacks [11, 1, 7] . The following formula (see e.g. [1] ) provides an approximation of the average number m(d) of multiples Q of P which have weight d and degree at most D, Q(X) = 1 +
Boolean Functions for Stream Ciphers
A Boolean function with n variables is a function from the set of n-bit words, F 
where u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) and
The coefficients a u of the ANF can be obtained from the Möbius transform of f [10] :
where ⊕ denotes the addition over F 2 and α β describes the partial ordering on the Boolean lattice. This means that α β if and only if
The Walsh-Hadamard transform of a Boolean function f refers to the Fourier transform of the corresponding sign function,
u·x where u · x denotes the usual scalar product. The Walsh coefficient χ f (u) then estimates the Hamming distance between f and the affine function u · x + ε, ε ∈ F 2 , both seen as Reed-Muller codewords [10] . A Boolean function is obviously completely characterized by its Walsh spectrum. The coefficients of the algebraic normal form of f can then be computed from its Walsh coefficients as follows. 
Then we have, for all
u ∈ F n 2 , a u = 2 wt(u)−1 1 − 1 2 n v ū χ f (v)
mod 2 wherē u denotes the bitwise completion to 1 and wt(u) is the Hamming weight of u, i.e., the number of its non-zero components.
Proof. From Equation (2) we have for any u ∈ F n 2
Since the normalized Fourier transform is involutive, we have
By combining these relations, we deduce that
The set
We then obtain that, for all u ∈ F n 2 ,
This proposition will be used in the attack for recovering the algebraic normal form of the combining function. It is well-known that a combining function must fulfill some criteria to yield a cryptographically secure combination generator (see e.g. [3] ). Most notably, combination generators are vulnerable to "divide-and-conquer" attacks, called correlation attacks [17] . These techniques fail when the combining function has a high correlation-immunity order [16] .
Definition 1. A Boolean function is t-th order correlation-immune if the probability distribution of its output is unaltered when any t input variables are fixed.
This property equivalently asserts that the output of f is statistically independent of any linear combination of t input variables. Correlation-immunity can be characterized by the Walsh spectrum of the function [18] : f is t-th order correlation-immune if and only if
Since any t-th order correlation-immune function is k-th order correlation-immune for any k ≤ t, we call correlation-immunity order of a function f the highest integer t such that f is t-th order correlation-immune. Note that the correlationimmunity order of a function with n variables can not exceed (n−1). This comes from Parseval's relation:
This equality also points out the existence of a trade-off between the correlationimmunity order and the nonlinearity of a function.
Recovering the LFSRs
We now show how the key-stream generator depicted in Figure 1 can be reconstructed from the knowledge of some ciphertext bits.
In the rest of the paper we use the following notation. n denotes the number of constituent LFSRs. L i and P i denote the length and the feedback polynomial of the i-th LFSR and s i refers to the generated sequence. The sequences y, m and c respectively correspond to the key-stream, to the plaintext and to the ciphertext. When dealing bitwise, we use t as index time.
The plaintext is assumed to be the output of a binary memoryless source with P [m t = 0] = p 0 = 1 2 . All commonly used coding scheme (ASCII, Murray, CCITTx . . . ) satisfy this hypothesis. Moreover, the value of p 0 is supposed to be known. Practical values of p 0 are usually greater than 0.6.
The first step of the reconstruction consists in recovering the feedback polynomials of the constituent LFSRs.
Statistical Model
We first point out that the knowledge of a sequence s which is correlated with the ciphertext sequence provides some information on the feedback polynomials of the constituent LFSRs. 
Proof. We obviously have 
Note that some variables may not appear in the algebraic normal form of g.
If s is such that P [c t = s t ] = 1/2 we deduce from the previous proposition and from Proposition 1 that the feedback polynomial of s is related to the feedback polynomials P 1 ,. . . ,P n . This result leads to the following algorithm for recovering some information on P 1 , . . . ,P n . Let Q be a subset of F 2 [X]. For each Q ∈ Q, we determine whether S(Q) contains a sequence which is correlated with the ciphertext. If such a sequence exists, Q provides some information on P 1 ,. . . ,P n . We here choose for Q the set of all polynomials of 
Corollary 1. Let S(Q)
is a multiple of lcm i∈supp(u) P i where supp(u) = {i, u i = 1}. Since all feedback polynomials are usually primitive, we have lcm i∈supp(u) P i = i∈supp(u) P i in most practical situations. Moreover, we have
Example 1. We consider the combination generator described by Geffe [4] . It consists of three LFSRs combined by the Boolean function f (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) = x 1 x 2 + x 2 x 3 + x 1 . Assume that the feedback polynomials of the constituent LFSRs are randomly chosen primitive polynomials and that their lengths are respectively L 1 = 15, L 2 = 17 and L 3 = 23. Let c be the ciphertext sequence obtained by adding the output of Geffe generator to a plaintext with p 0 = 0.5. Let Q be the set of all polynomials of weight 4 and of degree at most 10000. For all Q ∈ Q, we determine whether S(Q) contains a sequence which is correlated with c. We deduce from Formula (1) that, for a randomly chosen polynomial P of degree L, Q contains a multiple of P of weight 4 if L ≤ 37. Our algorithm is then expected to detect multiples of P 1 , P 2 , P 3 and P 1 P 2 . Note that P 2 can not be detected by the algorithm since the Walsh coefficient χ f (0, 1, 0) vanishes.
A simple method for determining whether S(Q) contains a sequence which is correlated with c consists in computing the parity-check equation corresponding to Q for the ciphertext bits. The efficiency of this procedure strongly depends on the weight of Q. 
Then the random variable
zt has a Gaussian distribution with
Proof. Let s ∈ S(Q) be such that |P
For all t, we decompose c t as c t = s t ⊕ e t where P [e t = 1] = 1 − p. Then we have
e t−ij = 1] since s satisfies the recurrence relation because s ∈ S(Q). This implies that z t = 1 if and only if the number of indexes i ∈ {t, t − i 1 , . . . , t − i d−1 } such that e i = 1 is odd. Therefore we have
The random variable Z can now be expressed as Z = (N
z t . All random variables z t are independent and identically distributed. Due to the central limit theorem [2] , the random variable 
If all sequences in S(Q) are statistically independent of c, Z has Gaussian distribution with mean value 0 and variance (N − i d−1 ) since ε = 0 in this case. We now want to distinguish between two hypotheses:
We use a decision threshold T , T > 0, for discriminating hypotheses H 0 and H 1 . If |Z| < T , H 0 is kept; if |Z| ≥ T , H 1 is accepted. The minimum number of required ciphertext bits, N , depends on the number of wrong decisions that we allow. This number corresponds to the probability for a false alarm,
The decision threshold is determined by the probability for a non-detection,
Then we have
Similarly the probability for a non-detection is given by
since M is not necessarily positive. In most cases, Φ(
) is much smaller than P n and than Φ(
). Then this latter will approximate P n . The predetermined value of P n fixes the choice for the threshold:
Similarly, the predetermined probability for a false alarm gives the minimum value of (N − i d−1 ):
After different attempts to tune up the best values for P f and P n , we choose P f = 2 −20 and P n = 10 −3 . In practical situations the known ciphertext sequence does not consist of a large number of consecutive bits. The attacker has access to some ciphertext blocks of reasonable lengths. These ciphertexts may be produced with different keys, i.e., with different LFSR initializations. Theorem 1 can nevertheless be adapted to this more realistic situation.
Corollary 2. Let Q be a polynomial in F 2 [X] of weight d having the following form Q(X)
= 1 + d−1 j=1 X ij with i 1 < i 2 < . . . < i d−1 . For n c ciphertexts c k , 1 ≤ k ≤ n c ,
of respective lengths LC(k), we consider the binary sequence
(z k t ) i d−1 ≤t<LC(k),1≤k≤nc defined by z k t = c k t ⊕ d−1 j=1 c k t−ij .
Then the random variable
has a Gaussian distribution with mean value
and with variance
where
The following algorithm then examines all polynomials of degree at most D and of weight d, and it detects all polynomials Q in this set such that there exists
Some gcd computations on the obtained polynomials provide the primitive factors which are detected several times. These primitive factors are expected to be the feedback polynomials of the constituent LFSRs.
Complexity Analysis
We now discuss the choice of the input parameters d, D and ε min .
Recall that we aim at recovering multiples of polynomials i∈T P i , T ⊂ {1, . . . , n} such that |P [c t = i∈T s i t ] − 1/2| ≥ ε min . According to Formula (3), these subsets T are characterized by
where the i-th component of 1 T equals 1 if and only if i ∈ T . It is well-known that all Walsh coefficients of a Boolean function f with n variables are divisible by 4, unless f has degree n. This case is here dismissed since such a function cannot be balanced. Choosing
then ensures to detect all polynomials i∈T P i such that χ f (1 T ) = 0. In most practical situations, the number of variables n does not exceed 7.
We now assume that our search can be restricted to all products i∈T P i of degree at most L max . This means that we suppose that all feedback polynomials P 1 ,. . . ,P n can be recovered from all products i∈T P i such that
Note that L max should obviously be greater than the maximum length of all constituent LFSRs. A polynomial of degree L max is then recovered by our algorithm if it divides at least one polynomial of weight d and of degree at most D. We deduce from Formula (1) that the minimum possible value for D is approximatively
This also implies that the attack can only use ciphertext blocks of length at least LC with
Moreover, we want the probability for a false alarm in the algorithm to be less than 2 −20 . This implies that (
2 . By replacing T by its value, we obtain the following condition
where N t = nc k=1 LC(k) is the total ciphertext length. We deduce that
It finally follows that the total ciphertext length should satisfy
This value is minimal if n c = 1, i.e., if all known ciphertext bits are consecutive. In this case, the minimum length of the ciphertext sequence required by the reconstruction is
This formula points out that the optimal value of d increases with L max . In most practical situations, all ciphertext blocks have roughly the same length LC. The number n c of such ciphertext blocks required by the reconstruction is then
We then use the algorithm with the value of d which minimizes this formula. The number of operations performed by the algorithm is roughly
Using equations (5) and (8), we obtain the following complexity
Another method for recovering the feedback polynomials of the LFSRs consists in examining all polynomials of degree at most L max and in computing the corresponding parity-check equations on the ciphertext sequence. A similar analysis applies to this attack. We here have to choose D = L max and d L max /2 since the average weight of a polynomial of degree L max is roughly L max /2. With these parameters, Formula (7) provides the minimum ciphertext length required by this second attack:
We easily see that this number is much larger that the number of ciphertext bits required by our attack (see Formula (8)). Moreover, the number of operations performed by this second attack is roughly
Our attack is then much more efficient than the enumeration of all polynomials of degree L max .
Simulation Results
We consider the following toy example of combination generator. Three LFSRs are combined by the majority function f (
The feedback polynomials are respectively
The output of this combination generator is used for encrypting a plaintext with p 0 = 0.70. We take ε min = 0.1; this value corresponds to Formula (4) with n = 3. We applied our algorithm with parameters D = 3, 620 and d = 3 (which is the optimal value for these parameters). We used 170 ciphertext blocks of length 10,000 (i.e., around 1,200 ASCII characters). Note that Formula (10) gives n c = 157. Exactly 263 trinomials have been detected by our algorithm. All of these trinomials are divisible by one of the feedback polynomials. This means that the effective probability for a false alarm is zero. Moreover, all multiples of P 1 , P 2 and P 3 of degree at most 3,620 have been detected (see Table 1 ). This simulation required roughly one week on a DEC alpha workstation at 433 MHz.
We also checked our attack on the same example where 
Recovering of the Combining Function
A method for recovering the combining function was developed in [12] but it requires the knowledge of all LFSR initializations. Moreover, this technique relies on Siegenthaler's correlation attack; its complexity is then exponential in the lengths of the constituent LFSRs. We now show how to bypass these limitations and to practically reconstruct the combining function.
The number of variables of the combining function is derived from the previous step of our attack. Moreover, the previous analysis also provides an estimation of some Walsh coefficients of the combining function. Suppose that some multiples of weight d of i∈T P i , T ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, have been detected by our algorithm. For any such multiple, the mean value of the estimator Z equals  N (2p − 1) d , where p = P [c t = s t ] with s = g(s 1 , . . . , s n ) and g(x) = 1 T · x. The values of Z obtained for all detected multiples of i∈T P i therefore provides an estimation of probability p. Using Formula (3), we can then compute the value of the corresponding Walsh coefficient, χ f (1 T ). This value is rounded to the closest multiple of 4, since all the Walsh coefficients are divisible by 4 for balanced functions.
If i∈T P i has degree L greater than L max , no multiple was detected by the algorithm. We then choose a higher value of d satisfying
We then compute all multiples of i∈T P i of weight d and degree at most LC, and the corresponding values of Z. We deduce the involved Walsh coefficient as previously seen. For each detected P i we compute some multiples of weight 5 and of degree at most 10,000 for each product P i P j . Although all of these products were potentially detectable, no one was detected; we then deduce that 
